Measuring and Testing Advertising-Induced Rotation in the Demand Curve by Zheng, Yuqing et al.
Measuring and Testing Advertising-Induced 




Yuqing Zheng − Cornell University (Hyz248@cornell.eduH) 
Henry W. Kinnucan − Auburn University 





Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the American Agricultural Economics 




Abstract: Advertising can rotate the demand curve if it changes the dispersion of 
consumers’ valuations.  We provide an elasticity form measure of the advertising-
induced demand curve rotation in five demand models and test for its presence in the 
U.S. non-alcoholic beverage market.  The AIDS model reveals that doubling 
advertising spending rotates the demand curves clockwise for milk, and coffee and 
tea with associated slope changes of 7.3% and 11.6%.  Soft-drink advertising rotates 
its demand curve counterclockwise.  Our policy suggestion is that milk and soft-
drink firms might enhance profits by timing advertising to coincide with high- and 




Copyright 2007 by Yuqing Zheng, Henry W. Kinnucan, and Harry M. Kaiser. All 
rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-
commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on 
all such copies. Measuring and Testing Advertising-Induced 
Rotation in the Demand Curve 
 
Introduction 
The goal of this research is to model and measure the effects of advertising allowing 
for both outward (parallel) shifts and advertising-induced rotation in demand curves, 
with an application to the U.S. non-alcoholic beverage market.  Largely viewed as 
being persuasive or informative (Bagwell 2005), advertising has received a large 
number of studies on its shift effects on demand (Nelson and Moran 1995; Dong, 
Chung, and Kaiser 2004).  Simply enough, advertising, however, can rotate the 
demand curve if it changes the dispersion of consumers’ valuations.  Surprisingly, as 
Johnson and Myatt (2006, p. 756) pointed out, “While demand rotation is an 
elementary concept, it has received remarkably little formal study.”  Johnson and 
Myatt (2006) further proposed a new taxonomy of advertising in which hype shifts 
demand by emphasizing the product’s existence and real information rotates demand 
by matching the product’s characteristics with the consumer’s subjective 
preferences.
1  Quilkey (1986, p. 51) provided another theoretical explanation for the 
demand curve rotation by arguing that advertising can rotate demand by stressing 
either a product’s “substitutability for other products in its end uses” 
(counterclockwise) or uniqueness (clockwise).  If advertising rotates the demand 
curve, two empirical questions follow and should be answered.  First, to which 
direction and by how much would advertising rotate the demand curve?  Second, 
what are the marketing implications for producers who advertise their products?  We 
  2address the first question by providing an elasticity form measure of the advertising-
induced demand curve rotation in five demand models and testing for its presence in 
non-alcoholic beverages, thereafter we address the second question using Frisch’s 
(1959) duality relation.   
Despite a long-standing hypothesis that the advertising of farm products 
alters own-price demand elasticities (Waugh 1959; Quilkey 1986), and the 
importance of the hypothesis for allocation decisions (Chung and Kaiser 1999) and 
producer returns (Zhang and Sexton 2002), there is little research to date that has 
tested this hypothesis.  The only known tests in the agricultural economics literature 
are the studies of domestic cotton promotion by Ding and Kinnucan (1996) and of 
fluid milk and cheese advertising by Schmit and Kaiser (2004) in which the 
hypothesis of curve rotation was both rejected, and a study by Chung and Kaiser 
(2000) in which advertising was found to make demand less elastic for New York 
City fluid milk market.
2  Furthermore, in the marketing literature where the 
hypothesis has received greater attention there is evidence that advertising can 
indeed influence consumers’ sensitivity to price.  In particular, Wittink (1977) found 
that of 20 studies that addressed the issue 15 showed evidence of curve rotation, 
with seven indicating a more elastic demand due to advertising and eight a less 
elastic demand.   
The purpose of this research is to address the direction, size, and marketing 
implications of the advertising-induced rotation in the demand curve for non-
alcoholic beverages.  Compared with alcoholic beverage or tobacco advertising 
(Saffer and Dave 2002; Keeler et al. 2004), non-alcoholic beverage advertising 
  3received much less attention in the literature.  Recent research by Kinnucan et al. 
(2001) firmly rejected the hypothesis that non-alcoholic beverage advertising has no 
effect on the level of demand for the individual beverages.  Specifically, they found 
advertising redistributed demand within the non-alcoholic beverage group (juices 
benefited the most from advertising), but had no effect on the overall group demand.  
What is not known is whether the advertising affects the slopes of the demand 
curves.  Given the firm rejection of no shift effect, this would appear to be an 
especially promising group in which to test whether there is a rotation effect.  
Prior to model specification we explain how advertising affects slopes of the 
demand curve based on Johnson and Myatt’s work (2006) and distinguish between 
curve rotation and elasticity change based on the theoretical paper by Kinnucan and 
Zheng (2004); thereafter we introduce price-advertising interaction terms into five 
different demand models and develop methods to measure curve rotation caused by 
the interaction, and derive some propositions about price-advertising interaction 
using Frisch’s duality relationship.
3  The results of the hypothesis tests are then 
presented employing time-series data.  The article concludes with a brief summary 
of the key findings.  Overall, this research is a full empirical extension of the work 
of Kinnucan and Zheng (2004). 
 
How Advertising Rotates the Demand Curve 
This section illustrates advertising’s shift and pivotal effects on demand using a 
numerical example.  According to Johnson and Myatt (2006), advertising can shift a 
demand curve by shifting the location of consumers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP); it 
  4can rotate a demand curve as well by changing the spread of the WTP.  The former 
case is illustrated in figures (1a-1c), and the latter case is illustrated in figures (1d-
1f), wherein the dotted and boldfaced curves denote scenarios before and after a 
hypothetical successful advertising campaign for milk, respectively.  Suppose the 
WTP for milk before the advertising follows a normal distribution with a mean of 
three and a variance of one.  The dotted curve in figure (1a) represents the 
probability distribution function (pdf) of the milk WTP.  A successful milk 
advertising campaign was usually assumed to shift the pdf of the milk WTP outward 
without changing its spread, implying that the advertising increased the WTP of all 
milk consumers unanimously.  If the milk advertising increases every consumer’s 
WTP by two (a large number to make the curves before and after advertising look 
distinct), then the pdf of the milk WTP after the advertising follows a normal 
distribution with a mean of five and a variance of one, represented by the boldfaced 
curve in figure (1a).  An outward shift of the pdf results in an outward shift of the 
cumulative distribution function (cdf), which is shown in figure (1b).  Note that any 
point cdf(WTP0) on the cdf curve indicates the proportion of consumers that will not 
purchase milk since their WTP’s are less than WTP0.  Therefore, q (=1- cdf(WTP0)) 
is the proportion of consumers that will purchase milk for a given price of WTP0.  
Mapping the WTP to the vertical axis and corresponding q to the horizontal axis, we 
have the familiar inverse demand curves in figure (1c), which shows that an outward 
shift of the pdf caused by the advertising finally leads to an outward shift of the 
demand curve.  
  At issue here is that advertising may change the spread of the pdf by 
  5influencing consumers’ WTP by a varying degree.  As Johnson and Myatt (2006) 
argues, if advertising is unambiguously persuasive, then it will shift the demand 
curve outward; however, it may discourage some customers from purchasing while 
encouraging others, which leads to a rotation in the demand curve.   
  Figure (1d) presents two pdf’s of the milk WTP before and after another 
hypothetical milk advertising campaign.  The two pdf’s are normally distributed 
with a common mean of three but different variances at one and 1.5, respectively.  
The flatter and boldfaced pdf indicates that advertising increases the proportion of 
customers that have high WTP for milk, as well as the proportion of customers that 
have low WTP for milk.  As an example, a milk advertising campaign emphasizing 
the contribution of drinking milk to weight loss may increase milk lovers’ valuations 
of milk; however, it may reduce the valuations of milk among those who seek 
nutritional elements from milk as a cheap source.  Figure (1e) shows that if the pdf 
gets flatter, then the corresponding cdf rotates clockwise and intersects the original 
cdf at the mean of WTP, WTP* (they intersect at the mean of WTP because the 
advertising does not shift the pdf in this case).  As a result, the demand curve rotates 
clockwise around WTP* in figure (1f).  Overall, if advertising is able to shift and 
change the spread of the WTP simultaneously, the effects of advertising on demand 
curves reduce to a rotation effect.  Note that if the milk advertising campaign 
induces those who like milk to become milk lovers without changing the proportion 
of those who dislike or hate milk, it leads to a kinked demand curve instead.  
 
Curve Rotation and Elasticity Change 
  6  7
Kinnucan and Zheng (2004) showed that the effect of advertising on the own-price 
elasticity in absolute value (η ) depends not only on the extent to which advertising 
expenditure (A) rotates the demand curve (a rotation effect), but also on the shift in 
the curve (a shift effect).  Specifically, when prices are assumed exogenous, this 














where q and p stand for quantity and prices, respectively,  p q ∂ −∂ = ∆ /  is the 
demand curve’s slope in absolute value,  ln ∂  stands for logarithmic partial 
differential, and  A q ln / ln ∂ ∂ = α  is the horizontal relative shift in the demand 
curve due to a small change in advertising, i.e., the shift in the quantity direction 
holding prices constant.
4  A clockwise (counterclockwise) rotation, for example, 
implies that  A ln / ln ∂ ∆ ∂  is less than (greater than) zero. 
Because this shift effect (the commonly known “advertising elasticity”) is 
generally positive, it will either reinforce or offset the rotation effect depending on 
the latter’s sign.  For example, if  A ln / ln ∂ ∆ ∂  > 0, the effect of this type of 
advertising on the own-price elasticity is ambiguous, dependent on the relative 
magnitude of α .  Conversely, if  A ln / ln ∂ ∆ ∂ < 0, then  A ln / ln ∂ ∂ η  is 
unambiguously negative in the presence of a positive shift effect.  The upshot is that 
the shift effect complicates the interpretation of advertising’s effect on the own-price 
elasticity, especially in situations where the advertising is designed to make demand 
more price elastic.  Stated differently, the shift effect biases the results in favor of 
making demand less price elastic, regardless of the advertising’s original intent.     8
Empirically, a rotation in the demand curve can be determined by estimating 
a demand equation (or system of equations) with price and advertising entered as 
interaction terms and testing whether the interaction terms are significant.  
Following Cramer (1973) five widely-used demand models − a linear model, a semi-
log model, a compensated double-log model motivated by Alston, Chalfant, and 
Piggott (2002), a Rotterdam model, and a linear approximate almost ideal demand 
system (AIDS) − are specified to test whether advertising rotates demand curves as 
follows:  
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where i indexes the four beverages (n = 4) in the non-alcoholic group (fluid milk, 
juices, soft drinks (including carbonated soft drinks and bottled water), and coffee 
and tea; pi, qi, wi, and Ai, are the price, demand, budget share, and advertising for 
group i; d ln denotes the logarithmic first-difference operator;  ∑ = =
4
1 i i iq p Y is group 
expenditure; P* denotes Stone’s geometric price index ( i i i p w P ln * ln
4
1 ∑ = = ); the   9
term ∑ = =
4
1 ln ln
i i i q d w Q d is the Divisia volume index; Age5 is the proportion of the 
U.S. population less than age five; Fafh is the ratio of food-away-from home 
expenditures to food-at-home expenditures; time subscript for each variable is 
suppressed here for ease of derivation of the rotation effect.  For ease of discussion, 
equations (2) - (6) are denoted as models A - E if the price-advertising interaction 
terms are not included and models F - J otherwise.  Following Kinnucan et al. (2001, 
p. 5), these (conditional) models treat non-alcoholic beverages as a weakly separable 
group since Moschini et al. (1994) found empirical evidence supporting the 
commonly used separability assumption in modelling food demand.   
Table 1 summarizes the own-price elasticities in absolute values, 
advertising’s effects on the own-price elasticities which are derived in the 
appendices A and B, and their decomposition into the rotation and shift effects.  The 
first column lists the own-price elasticities (ηi’s).
5  Taking the logarithmic partial 
differential of ηi with respect to advertising expenditure Ai yields  i i A ln / ln ∂ ∂ η , 
which is reported in the second column.  Finally, by adding the shift effect (αii) to 
the i i A ln / ln ∂ ∂ η , we have the rotation effect ( i i A ln / ln ∂ ∆ ∂ ) according to equation 
(1). 
  Implications from table 1 are threefold.  First, an econometric test of whether 
advertising affects the own-price elasticity is a joint test of a curve rotation and shift 
(Kinnucan and Zheng 2004), echoing our conclusion made in the beginning of the 
second section that curve rotation is neither necessary (as shown in model C) nor 
sufficient (as shown in model A) for advertising to alter the own-price elasticity.   10
Second, advertising can rotate the demand curve even when the price-
advertising interaction terms are not included.  For a double-log model featuring 
constant elasticity (model C), the demand curve must rotate to offset the advertising-
induced shift effect to keep the own-price elasticity unchanged in most cases.  As an 
illustration let two demand curves be 
η − = P Q1  and 
α ηA P Q
− = 2  with the own-price 
elasticity (absolute value), advertising expenditure, and advertising elasticity taking 
the hypothetical values of 2, 500, and 0.05, respectively.  A horizontal comparison 
(Q is the horizontal axis) of slopes between Q1 and Q2 clearly shows that a positive 
and advertising-induced shift in demand makes the demand curve flatter.  The shift 
effect and shift-related rotation effect, in this case, are both 0.05.   Relaxing the 
assumption of fixed prices will alter the magnitude of the shift and shift-related 
rotation effects, but will not change the fact that advertising rotates the demand 
curve unless supply elasticity is unitary.  Advertising can also rotate the demand 
curve through its influence on budget shares (in models D and E).  We, therefore, 
consider the rotation effects as shift-related if they are induced by a shift in demand 
caused by advertising.  All the rotation effects in models A - E are shift related.  
Note the shift-related rotation effects are function specific, as they arise in models C 
- E due to constraints on functional forms (e.g., constant elasticity in model C) and 
could disappear otherwise (as in models A and B).   
  The last implication builds upon the second one.  Combining the rotation 
effects with and without the price-advertising interaction effects yields the 
interaction-related rotation effects.  In the presence of a price-advertising interaction 
term, the rotation effects in models F - J combine an interaction-related rotation   11
effect, as well as a shift-related rotation effect.  Once segregated from the shift-
related rotation effects, the interaction-related rotation effects for models F - J 
are ) /( i i ii i A c γ γ + , ) ln /( i i ii i A c γ γ + , ) ln /( i i ii i A c γ γ + , ) ln /( i i ii i A d c γ γ + , and 
) ln /( ) ln ( i i i ii
n
j
ij j i i i w A c w A − + + ∑ γ α γ γ , respectively.  Taking the Rotterdam model 
(model I) as an example, the effect of advertising on the own-price elasticity can be 
decomposed into three parts: an interaction-related rotation effect of 
) ln /( i i ii i A c γ γ +  or ) /( i i i w η γ − , a shift-related rotation effect of∑
n
j
ij j w α , and the 
negative of a shift effect of  ii α .
6  Using the above interaction-related rotation effects 
to measure the advertising-induced demand curve rotation is advantageous because 
it reflects the “true” rotation effects indicated by the price-advertising interaction 
terms γi’s, and because of the ease of interpretation and comparison across demand 
models since they are in the form of elasticities. 
Additional insight can be obtained by noting that the second-order cross 
partial derivatives of any particular function are unaffected by the order in which the 
derivative is taken.  Thus, in the simple case where quantity demanded qD is defined 
to be a function of price and advertising: 
(7)  ) , ( A p D qD =       













or, in elasticity notion,   12
(8) 






where η is (as before) expressed in absolute value.  Thus, if advertising has no effect 
on the own-price elasticity, then by (8) it must also be true that price has no effect on 
the advertising elasticity.  The latter inference contradicts an argument underlying 
Chung and Kaiser’s (1999) analysis, namely that advertising would be more 
effective at shifting the demand curve when prices are low than when prices are 
high.  As noted by Frisch (p. 180) equations such as (8) are invariant under a general 
(non-linear) transformation of the utility function.  Hence, the hypothesis based on 
(8) that the advertising-price interaction effect should be non-zero is quite general. 
 
 
Data and Estimation Procedures 
The models F - J were estimated using U.S. annual time series data for the period 
1970-2004.  Variable definitions and some description statistics of the data are 
reported in table 2.  The price and quantity data were obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Labor’s CPI Detailed Report (price of bottled water was obtained 
from Beverage Marketing Corporation) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 
Food Disappearance Data, respectively; the advertising data were obtained from 
private sources, chiefly Ad $ Summary published by Leading National Advertisers, 
Inc.  The price data were divided by the CPI for all items (1982−1984 = 100) to 
remove the effects of inflation.  A complete description of the data covering the 
period 1970−1994, including sources, is available in Kinnucan et al. (2001, pp. 24-
28).  Their data were updated in three aspects for use in this article: (i) ten more 
years of data were collected to extend the data period to 2004, (ii) advertising   13
expenditures were deflated by a media cost index (2004 = 100) computed from 
annual changes in promotion and advertising costs by media type provided by Dairy 
Management Inc., and (iii) bottled water was added to the soft drinks group to reflect 
its current place of the second-largest non-alcoholic beverage category by volume.
7  
Some years of bottled-water data − consumption prior to 1976, price prior to 1984, 
and advertising prior to 1985 − were not available (note its consumption per capita 
was very low at 1.6 gallons in 1976 and its advertising expenditures were only $12 
million in 1985, compared with its counterparts of 23.2 gallons and $116 million in 
2004) and therefore interpolated linearly using data from their most adjacent years.   
  Equations were estimated using the PROC MODEL procedure in SAS 
version 9.13, and as a system using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions to account for 
contemporaneous correlation among individual equation errors (Griffiths, Hill, and 
Judge 1993, p. 551).
8 In the case of the Rotterdam and AIDS models one equation 
(juices) was dropped to avoid singularity in the variance-covariance matrix.  As 
indicated, the Rotterdam and AIDS models were estimated with homogeneity and 
symmetry imposed on both prices and advertising expenditures (Selvanathan 1989), 
and adding-up was used to recover the coefficients from the omitted equation.   
 
Results and Marketing Implications 
Table 3 reports the parameters estimates for models F - J.  Estimation results are 
satisfactory in the sense that the adjusted R
2s range from 0.83 to 0.99 in the AIDS 
model to between 0.38 and 0.53 in the Rotterdam model.  The majority of the 
Durbin-Watson statistics center around two with some falling into the inconclusive   14
region regarding serial correlation (especially in the AIDS model).  Overall, the 
models appear to do a better job of explaining milk, soft-drink and coffee and tea 
demand than juice demand.  All own-price parameters (except the one for coffee and 
tea in model J) in models I and J are statistically significant (at the 5% level unless 
noted otherwise) with correct signs, while only few of them are statistically 
significant in models F - H, indicating the advantage of using demand system over 
single equation.  The own-advertising parameter is statistically significant only for 
soft drinks in models F, G, and J.  The price-advertising interaction term is found 
weakly significant (at the 10% level) for soft drinks and coffee and tea in model F, 
significant for soft drinks in model G, and significant for milk, soft drinks, and 
coffee and tea model J.  Furthermore, most of the models show higher proportion of 
population under age five leads to higher demand for milk, and more dining out 
(higher Fafh) leads to higher demand for soft drinks and lower demand for milk, and 
coffee and tea, which are all consistent with expectation. 
  Base on the estimates in table 3, we calculate the own price and advertising 
elasticities, compute interaction-related rotation effects according to the formulae in 
table 1, and report them in table 4.  Wald statistics for the null hypothesis that the 
estimated interaction effects are jointly zero are also reported.
 9  We report own 
advertising elasticities when γi or dii is found significant and report interaction-
related rotation effects when γi is found significant.  The linear, semi-log, and AIDS 
models reject the null hypothesis that the estimated interaction effects are jointly 
zero at the 5% level based on the Wald statistics.  To put the results of rotation effect 
into perspective, we focus on interpreting the results of the AIDS model given the theoretical advantages inherent in demand systems, the overall satisfactory 
significance in its estimates, and a more reasonable size of the rotation effect.  In 
addition, Duffy (2001) found that the AIDS model provided the “most suitable 
framework for investigating advertising effects” in U.K. alcoholic drinks markets, a 
finding that helps to justify our selection of the AIDS model. 
     For milk, the computed interaction-related rotation effect is -0.073, 
indicating a 10% increase in the milk advertising (note that most of the milk 
advertising is generic advertising) would reduce the slope (in absolute value) of milk 
demand by 0.73%, a number not seen in the literature.  Similarly, a 10% increase in 
the advertising of coffee and tea would decrease the slope of its demand by 1.16%.  
Conversely, advertising is found to increase the slope of soft-drink demand.  A 10% 
increase in the soft-drink advertising would increase the slope of its demand by 
0.49%.  As a robustness check, the AIDS model was estimated with the data prior to 
1976 deleted.  The price-advertising interaction terms hold significant at the 5% 
level, and D.W. statistics come closer to two. 
To put the results into perspective, figure 2 plots the two representative cases 
of demand curve rotation due to advertising, clockwise rotation for milk and 
counterclockwise rotation for soft drinks.  In figure (2a), a 10% increase in the milk 
advertising rotates the demand curve D0 clockwise to DR by reducing the size of its 
slope by 0.73% (measured at the mean advertising level).  When measured at the 
mean price level, the 10% increase in the milk advertisings increases milk demand 
by 0.19%.  What (2a) implies is that since advertising makes milk demand less 
elastic, it must also be true that an increase in price increases advertising’s ability to 
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shift the demand curve, which is an illustration of equation (8).  In other words, milk 
advertising is more effective in shifting milk demand when milk prices are higher 
(the dispersion between DR and D0 gets wider).  In this instance, a satiation 
phenomenon may be at work whereby the advertising elasticity increases as the 
quantity consumed decreases.  From a policy perspective, the positive term γ in the 
milk equation would imply that milk producers might enhance profits by timing 
advertising to coincide with high-price periods.  Conversely, figure (2b) indicates 
that the soft-drink advertising shifts its demand outward (from D0 to DS) but it is 
more effective in doing so when soft-drink prices are lower (from DS to DR).  The 
point is that the duality relation permits a richer interpretation of the interaction 
parameter than otherwise possible.  
Figure 3 plots the retail prices of the four beverages in real terms.  Milk has 
the second highest prices in the group.  Although milk has stable prices in the most 
recent 15 years, its relative price to other non-alcoholic beverages rose gradually 
from 1 in 1995 to 1.28 in 2005, a large increase of 28% (Kaiser 2006).  The current 
high prices of milk, coupled with our finding that milk advertising is more effective 
when milk prices are high, warrant the continuous existence of the milk check-off 
program, which funds the generic advertising for milk.  On the other hand, since 
soft-drink prices have been low and declining in the past 30 years, our finding that 
soft-drink advertising makes its consumers more sensitive to the price decline 
indicates that soft-drink producers enhanced their profits by the advertising-induced 
rotation in the demand curve.  Conversely, since the prices of coffee and tea have 
been the lowest in the group and have shown downward trend in the past 10 years,   17
the ideal advertising should make demand more elastic for coffee and tea.  In this 
sense, the coffee-and-tea advertising is not considered successful, which might 
already have been reflected in the historical expenditures on coffee.  The real 
advertising expenditure on coffee and tea in 2004 was only about a quarter of those 
in 1984 and a third of those in 1974.  Overall, advertising seems to have done the 
right job for milk and soft-drink producers.  
 
Conclusions  
Showing that advertising can influence own-price elasticity through combinations of 
its shift effect, shift-related and interaction-related rotation effects, this article 
provides an elasticity form measure of the interaction-related rotation effect in five 
demand models and tests for its existence in the non-alcoholic beverages.  Results 
are mixed in that compensated double-log model and the Rotterdam models fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of no price-advertising interaction while linear model, 
semi-log model, and the AIDS model indicate rejection.  Interaction-related rotation 
effects were found to be not robust to a change in model specification.  This 
confirms Hauser and Wernerfelt’s (1989) result that functional forms used to model 
advertising and price interactions influence conclusions about its direction. 
Since both model I and Kinnucan et al. (2001) use the Rotterdam model with 
similar data − although the former allows a price-advertising interaction effect and 
the latter does not, their results are comparable.
10  For example, model I’s estimated 
own-price parameters of -0.029, -0.067, -0.059, and -0.040 for the four beverages in 
their respective order compare favorably to their counterparts of -0.047, -0.057,  -0.060, and -0.032 obtained by Kinnucan et al. (2001).  All of the own-price 
parameters are statistically significant, confirming the strong influence of prices on 
the allocation of consumer spending.    The intercepts terms in both models reveal a 
positive consumption trend for soft drinks and a negative consumption trend for 
milk, and coffee and tea.  The main difference lies in that Kinnucan et al. (2001) 
found that advertising enhanced demand for juices, while model I does not report 
any statistically significant own advertising effect or price-advertising interaction 
effect. 
Results of the best-performing AIDS model indicate that advertising might 
have the ability to make the demand curve steeper for milk, and coffee and tea, as 
well as the ability to make the demand curve flatter for soft drinks.  For milk and 
coffee-and-tea advertising, this is the case depicted in figures (2d) – (2f), where 
advertising flattens the probability distribution of WTP.  For soft-drink advertising, 
it’s the reverse.  The implications are, although this might not be the true intention of 
producers who advertise their products, advertising of milk, and coffee and tea 
appeals better to consumers who have high WTP for them, while soft-drink 
advertising appeals better to consumers who have low WTP for it.  Our policy 
suggestion based on the AIDS model, therefore, is that milk and soft-drink firms 
might enhance profits by timing advertising to coincide with high- and low-price 
periods, respectively.  
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Notes:
                                                 
1 Real information actually plays a role similar to the match-products-to-buyers effect discussed by 
Bagwell (2005, p.19).  
 
2 The two models used by Schmit and Kaiser and Chung and Kaiser were the same in functional 
form.  The latter study used per capita fluid milk sales as the dependent variable while the former one 
used per capita retail fluid milk/cheese demand instead. 
 
3 Since Farr et al. (2001) and Tremblay and Okuyama (2001) argued that advertising could affect 
equilibrium consumption through its influence on supply (price competition), we don’t rule out the 
possibility of a price-advertising interaction relationship on the supply side.  The analysis done in this 
article is strictly on the demand side. 
 
4 Exogenous price is a common finding in the empirical literature (e.g., Brester and Schroeder, 1995; 
Kinnucan et al., 1997).   
 
5 Green and Alston (1990) show that all of the previously reported formulae for AIDS elasticities are 
incorrect when LA-AIDS is estimated instead of the true AIDS with a few exceptions including 
constant group price, i.e., d ln P* is independent of individual goods’ prices.  This condition is 
satisfied since this article assumes exogenous prices. 
 
6 Note  i w i A d i ii c / ) ln ( γ + −  is the Hicksian own-price elasticity ( h
i η ) for the Rotterdam model.  
The Marshallian own-price elasticity  ( m
i η ) is equal to  i b i w i A d i ii c − + − / ) ln ( γ .  The effect of 






i i A m
i
ln / ln ) / ( ln / ln ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ η η η η . 
 
7 In 2005, the volume shares of the three largest non-alcoholic beverage categories by volume were 
carbonated soft drinks (43.8%), bottled water (21.6%), and fluid milk (17.8%), according to Beverage 
Marketing Corporation. 
 
8 Results of t-statistics were much improved from using OLS to SUR, but remained alike from SUR 
to iterative SUR. 
9 For completeness purpose, all cii’s, dii’s, and γi’s were used to calculate the own demand elasticities 
but only significant cii’s, dii’s, and γi’s were used to calculate the own advertising elasticities and the 
interaction-related rotation effects except the dii in model J to avoid a negative own advertising 
elasticity for coffee and tea; price, demand, and advertising took their mean levels when they were 
needed.  
 
10 The difference of the two datasets is reported in detail in the section IV.   20
Table 1.  Decomposition of Advertising’s Effects on the Own-Price Elasticities with Fixed Prices  
Model Name 
(Model version in parenthesis) 
Elasticity   Price - Own   
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Table 2. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics, 1970-2004 
    Variable Definition Mean      Minimum Maximum s.d. 
q1  Per capita fluid milk consumption, gallons/person  26.13  21.20  31.30  2.92 
q2  Per capita juice consumption, gallons/person  7.66  5.60  9.10  1.02 
q3  Per capita soft-drink consumption, gallons/person  49.63  24.50  75.50  16.04 
q4  Per capita coffee-and-tea consumption, gallons/person  34.21  28.20  40.90  3.42 
p1  Retail price for fluid milk, $/gallons, CPI deflated  1.86  1.55  2.51  0.29 
p2  Retail price for juices, $/gallons, CPI deflated  3.03  2.73  3.43  0.19 
p3  Retail price for soft drinks, $/gallons, CPI deflated  1.37  0.97  1.88  0.26 
p4  Retail price for coffee and tea, $/gallons, CPI deflated  0.71  0.53  1.37  0.18 
A1  Advertising expenditures for fluid milk, million $, MCI deflated  98.19  17.45  243.31  55.92 
A2  Advertising expenditures for juices, million $, MCI deflated  428.00  85.40  702.04  128.36 
A3  Advertising expenditures for soft drinks, million $, MCI deflated  845.63  258.96  1216.92  198.06 
A4  Advertising expenditures for coffee and tea, million $, MCI deflated  498.75  150.39  823.16  189.08 
w1  Budget share for fluid milk, conditional  0.30  0.23  0.47  0.07 
w2  Budget share for juices, conditional  0.14  0.11  0.17  0.02 
w3  Budget share for soft drinks, conditional  0.40  0.25  0.50  0.08 
w4  Budget share for coffee and tea, conditional  0.15  0.11  0.23  0.03 
Fafh (%)  U.S. food-away-from home expenditures / total food expenditures   42.23  33.41  48.47  4.90 
Age5 (%)  Proportion of the U.S. population less than age five  7.37  6.78  8.37  0.41 
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Table 3. SUR Parameters Estimates for Models F - J 
  Price coefficients    Advertising coefficients  Interaction  Intercept  Expend.  Age5 Fafh   
Equations  ci1 c i2 c i3 c i4   d i1 d i2 d i3 d i4  γi a i b i e i f i  Adj. R
2 D.W. 
Linear (Model F)                            
Milk -0.479  1.378*  0.907  -2.044*    0.002  0.001  -0.002* 0.001  0.001  1.710  0.099** 2.437** -0.288** 0.99 2.06 
 (1.200)  (0.673)  (1.456)  (1.168)    (0.010)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.006)  (8.481)  (0.029)  (0.406)  (0.108)     
Juices -4.143**  -0.417  -1.638  -2.746*    0.001  0.010  -0.001 0.000  -0.003  19.485* 0.079** -0.715 -0.133 0.86  1.97 
 (1.267)  (1.530)  (1.626)  (1.343)    (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.003)  (10.955) (0.033) (0.457) (0.122)     
Soft drinks  -1.125  -0.600  -14.04**  -3.916    0.000  0.002 0.017**  -0.007*  -0.009* 64.428** 0.013 -7.144**  1.429** 0.99  1.81 
 (4.007)  (2.372)  (5.786)  (3.955)    (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.004) (0.005)  (29.401) (0.099) (1.415) (0.377)     
Coffee & tea  -3.718  0.438  -8.352**  -26.009**    -0.003  -0.003 0.002  -0.008  0.009* 44.371*  0.421** 0.129 -1.005**  0.93  2.33 
 (3.068)  (1.840)  (3.996)  (3.987)    (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.005) (0.005)  (22.923) (0.076) (1.106) (0.292)     
Semi-log (Model G)                       
Milk 4.658  7.020**  6.748**  -0.584    0.610  0.975*  -2.528**  0.693 -0.426  -28.423  14.947**  15.994** -14.629**  0.99  2.10 
 (4.329)  (1.611)  (1.283)  (0.674)    (0.597)  (0.475)  (0.821)  (0.463) (0.915)  (20.908) (4.115) (3.199) (4.049)     
Juices -4.481*  -6.799  1.093  0.046    0.262  -0.495  -0.227 -0.341  0.573  27.235  -0.069 -4.553  0.371 0.82  2.23 
 (2.540)  (27.463)  (1.997)  (0.983)    (0.253)  (4.893)  (1.093)  (0.608) (4.449)  (45.164) (5.743) (4.669) (5.714)     
Soft  drinks  -2.912 -1.405 22.708 -3.170    0.130  -0.628 6.196**  -2.177  -7.553**  -185.715**  23.807* -32.981** 46.944**  0.99  1.99 
  (5.803) (4.865) (19.095) (2.070)   (0.562) (1.484)  (2.644) (1.385)  (2.727)  (65.622)  (13.055) (10.038) (12.815)     
Coffee & tea  10.848*  12.115**  17.766**  -9.759    -0.094  -0.864  0.231 0.077 -0.322  -176.385**  72.147** 9.516 -45.787**  0.93 2.10 
 (5.464)  (4.560)  (3.454)  (9.406)    (0.532)  (1.394)  (2.297) (1.476)  (1.466)  (61.440)  (12.197)  (9.372)  (12.009)     
Double-log (Model H )                       
Milk -0.056  0.223**  0.258**  -0.008    -0.011  0.026  -0.110** 0.045**  0.037  0.908  0.593**  0.685** -0.486** 0.99 2.10 
 (0.179)  (0.060)  (0.049)  (0.025)    (0.025)  (0.018)  (0.031) (0.017)  (0.039)  (0.773)  (0.152)  (0.118)  (0.149)     
Juices -0.646*  -0.256  0.223  -0.001    0.032  0.066  -0.021 -0.047  -0.034  3.865  0.014 -0.689 0.054 0.84  2.27 
 (0.324)  (3.701)  (0.260)  (0.126)    (0.032)  (0.659)  (0.140) (0.078)  (0.600)  (5.954)  (0.732)  (0.599)  (0.729)     
Soft drinks  -0.133  -0.110  -0.637  -0.009    -0.006  -0.025 0.089  -0.012 0.040 -3.761**  0.668** -0.331 1.370** 0.99  2.13 
 (0.133)  (0.111)  (0.595)  (0.047)    (0.013)  (0.034)  (0.064) (0.032)  (0.086)  (1.495)  (0.298)  (0.229)  (0.292)     
Coffee & tea  0.330*  0.387**  0.546**  -0.074    -0.009  -0.026  0.013 -0.016 -0.043  -2.847  2.128** 0.237 -1.267**  0.92  1.97 
 (0.166)  (0.138)  (0.104)  (0.383)    (0.016)  (0.042)  (0.069) (0.049)  (0.060)  (1.855)  (0.368)  (0.283)  (0.363)     
Rotterdam (Model I)                       
Milk -0.029**  0.024**  0.000  0.004    -0.002  0.008**  -0.003  -0.002 -0.046 -0.004**  0.116** 0.043  -0.048 0.52  1.73                    
                       
               
                   
             
                 
             
(0.009)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.004)    (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.050) (0.001) (0.030) (0.039) (0.036)
Juices 0.024**  -0.067**  0.033* 0.010    0.008**  -0.006 -0.001 -0.010 0.103 -0.003 0.354** 0.074 0.027 0.38
 
2.53
  (0.010)  (0.031)  (0.017)  (0.014)    (0.003)  (0.014)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.173) (0.002) (0.111) (0.148) (0.132)
Soft drinks 
 
0.000  0.033*  -0.059**  0.026**    -0.003  -0.001 -0.006 0.010** -0.069 0.010** 0.198** 0.002 0.114* 0.53
 
1.84
  (0.008)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.007)    (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.008) (0.006) (0.209) (0.001) (0.055) (0.073) (0.065)
Coffee & tea 
 
0.004  0.010  0.026**  -0.040**    -0.002  -0.001  -0.010 0.002 0.012 -0.003** 0.332** -0.119 -0.093 0.51
 
2.95
  (0.004)  (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.012)    (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.008) (0.009) (0.048) (0.002) (0.080) (0.103) (0.091)
AIDS (Model J)                      
                   
               
                     
               
                   
             
                 
             
 
Milk 0.125**  -0.008  -0.080**  -0.037**   0.001  0.007  -0.006 -0.003 0.010** 2.032** -0.128 0.160** -0.409** 0.99
 
1.19
  (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.020)  (0.011)
 
    (0.004)  (0.004)
 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.320) (0.079) (0.062) (0.065)
Juices -0.008  0.064**  -0.075* 0.019    0.007 0.010 -0.019 0.002 -0.007 0.035 0.035 -0.092 0.026 0.83
 
1.90
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.039)  (0.022)    (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.011) (0.006) (0.004) (0.337) (0.087) (0.064) (0.067)
Soft drinks 
 
-0.080**  -0.075*  0.177**  -0.022    -0.006  -0.019 0.031** -0.007 -0.013** -1.749** -0.037 -0.027 0.654** 0.98
 
1.31
  (0.020)  (0.039)  (0.046)  (0.014)    (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.376) (0.112) (0.066) (0.082)
Coffee & tea 
 
-0.037**  0.019  -0.022  0.040    -0.003  0.002  -0.007 0.007 0.010** 0.682** 0.130** -0.041 -0.271** 0.97
 
1.31
  (0.011)  (0.022)  (0.014)  (0.026)    (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.212) (0.061) (0.039) (0.046)
Note: ** and * denote estimates are significant at the 5% level or less and at the 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4.  Own Price and Advertising Elasticities, and Interaction-Related Rotation Effects 
Model/Commodity Own-price Own-adv.  Interaction-related  Wald stat.  No rotation: γi = 0 
 elasticity  elasticity  rotation  effect    Reject at 5%? 
Linear (Model F )     11.11  Yes 
Milk -0.026  --  --    
Juices -0.720  --  --    
Soft drinks  -0.604  0.075  0.357    
Coffee & tea  -0.444  0.097  -0.218    
Semi-log (Model G)     19.08  Yes 
Milk 0.106  --  --    
Juices -0.439  --  --    
Soft drinks  -0.563  0.079  0.149    
Coffee & tea  -0.343  --  --    
Double-log (Model H )     2.29  No 
Milk 0.108  --  --    
Juices -0.462  --  --    
Soft drinks  -0.366  --  --    
Coffee & tea  -0.337  --  --    
Rotterdam (Model I)     0.98  No 
Milk -0.102  --  --    
Juices -0.427  --  --    
Soft drinks  -0.428  --  --    
Coffee & tea  -0.269  --  --    
AIDS (Model J)     11.76  Yes 
Milk -0.447  0.019  -0.073    
Juices -0.843  --  --    
Soft drinks  -0.772  0.069  0.049    
Coffee & tea  -0.324  0.023  -0.116    25
Figure 1.  Advertising’s Shift and Rotation Effects on Demand Curves 
 
WTP1 ~ N(3, 1), WTP2 ~ N(5, 1) 
 
 
WTP1 ~ N(3, 1), WTP2 ~ N(3, 1.5) 
 
 WTP* 
WTP*  WTP* 
 Figure 2.  The Effects of a 10% Increase in Milk or Soft-Drink Advertising 
Expenditures on Its Respective Demand 
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Appendix A 
When price-advertising interaction terms are not present in equations (2) – (6), the 
own demand elasticities (in absolute values) are 
LM
i η (= ) / ( i i ii q p c − ), 
SL
i η (= i ii q c / − ), 
DL
i η (= ii c − ), 
RM
i η (= i ii w c / − ), and 
AIDS
i η  (= ) 1 / ( − − i ii w c ), 





























































































Since the demand elasticities for the Rotterdam and AIDS models include a 
budget share,  i i A w ln /∂ ∂  is derived beforehand.  Note that: 
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(A9) 
) 1 / (
) )( / (
) 1 / (





























α α α α
η
   34
Appendix B 
With price-advertising interaction terms included in equations (2) – (6), the 
corresponding own demand elasticities (in absolute values) are  
LM
i η  (= ) / )( ( i i i i ii q p A c γ + − ), 
SL
i η (= i i i ii q A c / ) ln ( γ + − ), 
DL
i η  
(= ) ln ( i i ii A c γ + − ), 
RM
i η  (= i i i ii w A d c / ) ln ( γ + − ), and 
AIDS
i η  
(= ) 1 / ) ln (( − + − i i i ii w A c γ ), respectively.  The  A ln / ln ∂ ∂ η  term in table 1 is 
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Plugging (A6) into (B4) yields: 
(B5)  .
ln











w A d c
A γ








 Finally,   
(B6) 
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